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
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH REGIERUNGS DIREKTOR
DR. HANS-JOACHIM HORCHEM OF THE BfV

On the evening of 26 March my wife and I had an opportunity to spend some four hours with Dr. HORCHEM who was in town with a group of students from the NATO War College in Rome. The conversation covered a wide range of topics including the following which are briefly noted for any interest they might have.

A. Animosity between BfV President SCHRUEBBERS and Vice President NOLLAU: HORCHEM noted the divergent personalities of SCHRUEBBERS and NOLLAU and said that at the time of NOLLAU's appointment no one had expected them to function smoothly together. HORCHEM said that when NOLLAU had attacked his new job as vice president with characteristic energy, the normally phlegmatic SCHRUEBBERS had viewed this as a direct threat to his own position and had attempted to keep a damper on some of NOLLAU's more flamboyant activities. This has led to a degree of animosity between the two, but HORCHEM feels that SCHRUEBBERS is firmly in the saddle and that he fully expects to remain President of the BfV until he reaches mandatory retirement age in 1972. HORCHEM conceded that NOLLAU has not always handled himself as well as he might have and cited certain examples which are noted in paragraphs below. HORCHEM's own view of NOLLAU is not totally unbiased, and during the evening's conversation HORCHEM recounted again his role in bringing NOLLAU together with Herbert WEHNER of the SPD. (I recall reporting fully on this some years ago.) As much as HORCHEM admires NOLLAU, he still feels that NOLLAU is not always properly grateful for the support which HORCHEM has given him.

B. NOLLAU's Article on Defense Strategy: HORCHEM referred to NOLLAU's article which was published by the Stern magazine in which NOLLAU had advocated a cut in defense expenditure. NOLLAU's thesis was that the military threat from the Warsaw Pact, particularly the Satellite countries, could no longer be considered acute or even realistic and, in view of the then current budget difficulties which faced the Federal Republic, considerable savings should be effected in the military area. The Stern documented this article with a photograph of NOLLAU and attempted to lend authenticity to the article by citing NOLLAU's role as the BfV's expert on the communist threat. (It may be recalled that this article appeared during

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the time when NOLLAU and Siegfried FROEHLICH, of the Interior Ministry, were visiting CIA Headquarters.) HORCHEM stated that almost everyone had felt that NOLLAU would have to be removed from office because of what would have to be considered a breach of confidence. HORCHEM noted that SCHRUEBBERS in particular had felt that this was a further attempt by NOLLAU to gain even wider recognition and eventually pave the way for bigger things. HORCHEM said that Interior Minister LUECKE had wanted to remove NOLLAU immediately from office and that only a note of caution voiced by State Secretary GUMBEL had prevented this. According to HORCHEM, GUMBEL's caution would have brought only a brief respite for NOLLAU had it not been for WEHNER who went directly to LUECKE and indicated that the SPD would view with disfavor any attempt to remove NOLLAU for publishing the article.

C. NOLLAU's Action in Publicity about the RUNGE Case: HORCHEM referred to President SCHRUEBBER's visit to CIA after the RUNGE defection and to the rather elaborate arrangements which SCHRUEBBERS had worked out with CIA concerning post-defection publicity. HORCHEM noted that when SCHRUEBBERS had returned he had not immediately advised NOLLAU of all the details of the proposed campaign but had indicated to him that such a campaign was planned. Shortly thereafter, at a time when President SCHRUEBBERS was in Wiesbaden attending an Amtsleitertagung, Conrad AHLERS of the Bundespresseamt had approached the BfV and asked for some statement which might be publicized. NOLLAU, who could have reached SCHRUEBBERS by telephone, chose not to do so and proceeded to devise a statement for AHLERS on his own. HORCHEM noted that this action by NOLLAU had not done anything to ameliorate the animosity in the relationship between NOLLAU and SCHRUEBBERS. HORCHEM discussed the aftermath of the RUNGE defection, particularly as it affected the German Foreign Office, but did not add anything new to that which is already known about the case.

D. The Vice Presidency of the BND: HORCHEM said that WEHNER had offered NOLLAU the job of BND Vice President and that NOLLAU had accepted the job. Subsequent to this offer, NOLLAU told HORCHEM that the BND was actually being run on a day-to-day basis by a directorium of five BND department chiefs. NOLLAU had also said that he had learned that while he was indeed to receive the title of BND Vice President, his actual authority would be limited by this directorium which would continue to function, i.e., NOLLAU was to become a member of the directorium but would not exercise direct command authority over its decisions--this authority being exclusively reserved for the president of the BND. NOLLAU

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allegedly told WEHNER that he would not accept the job under those conditions, and apparently WEHNER was to inquire into the precise functions of the position before talking with NOLLAU again. HORCHEM has not heard anything further from NOLLAU on this score. However, HORCHEM noted that General WESSEL, who is to become the new BND President, had spoken to the NATO College in Rome; and HORCHEM had "learned from a colleague who had allegedly heard directly from WESSEL" that WESSEL had accepted the presidency of the BND with a clear understanding that it would not be necessary for him to have an alter ego or specifically designated Vice President.

Apparently WESSEL's concern was that his control over the BND might be diminished through political considerations which a political Vice President might bring to the job. HORCHEM does not believe that the SPD will insist upon being allowed to name a Vice President to the BND. He said that Chancellor KIESINGER has several patronage positions which he could offer to the SPD, and he cited the presidency of the Deutsche Bundesbahn as an example.

E. WEHNER's Role within the SPD and the Coalition: HORCHEM said that WEHNER continues to function as the SPD's "Kaderchef" and that his authority, therefore, continues undiminished. HORCHEM also stated that KIESINGER has greater confidence in the advice which he receives from WEHNER and AHLERS than that from any other source. In an aside HORCHEM referred to AHLERS as a journalist who can't write but who has the knack of dissecting a political situation with crystal clarity. HORCHEM noted that WEHNER gets on well with Franz Josef STRAUSS, and he recalled WEHNER's characterization of STRAUSS which WEHNER had given him at the time when HORCHEM was still slated to become WEHNER's personal assistant. In sparse and characteristic style WEHNER had said, "Don't worry about STRAUSS; he is a highly talented and highly qualified individual and a person with whom one can deal." HORCHEM foresees some possibility of STRAUSS attempting to capitalize on CDU dissent prior to the 1969 election, but HORCHEM noted that it isn't realistic to think of a Bavarian as Chancellor of the Federal Republic. (HORCHEM is, of course, a Rhinelaender.) HORCHEM does not feel that KIESINGER has become master in his own house, and he noted particularly his cautiousness in dealing with SCHROEDER and BARZEL. However, he feels that KIESINGER is the only person who can function effectively as the leader of the CDU. HORCHEM does not feel that the current internal opposition in the SPD should be taken overly seriously, and he expects a continuation of the CDU-SPD coalition after the election of 1969.

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F. Exchange of Heinz FELFE: HORCHEM referred to his own involvement in the prisoner exchange and stated that the exchange of FELFE may be expected in the near future. He recalled that at one point in previous exchange discussions the East Germans had indicated that they had some 75 individuals in their prisons who had been sentenced to at least ten years, and frequently life, for espionage on behalf of the Gehlen organization. HORCHEM stated that this pressure is simply too great to withstand and that FELFE's exchange may be expected shortly. HORCHEM praised what he described as DeGaulle's position in the question of prisoner exchange. He said that in France such matters were referred all the way to DeGaulle himself and that DeGaulle had answered with a grand no. HORCHEM said that the French had four or five agents in prison in whom the East Germans were particularly interested, and he noted that the East Germans had even effected an early release for a couple of French sources as a sign of good faith but that DeGaulle had been unmoved.

G. Offers to Dissolve the Warsaw Pact: HORCHEM, as a student at the NATO War College, has not been at the BfV since February; but he stated that prior to his departure the BfV had reports from certain KPD sources that the Soviets were preparing to offer to dissolve the Warsaw Pact if the West would not attempt to renegotiate the NATO agreements in 1969. HORCHEM noted that this would be an empty but predictable gesture since the Soviet Union has carefully negotiated bilateral pacts with the various members of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, he expects the Soviet Union to attempt a sizeable propaganda play in this direction. HORCHEM has himself become quite concerned with the problems of NATO in the past few weeks, and he is firmly convinced that it will be possible to continue NATO with a degree of French participation after the current contracts expire. He noted that there are no French students among the 50 members of his class, but he said that the French are careful to continue their participation through provision of guest lecturers at the College.

H. HORCHEM's Own Position and Future: HORCHEM was quite frank in expressing his lack of desire to continue to work for his present chief Heinrich DEGENHARDT. He is hopeful that a new job can be found for him in the BfV during the six months that he will be at the NATO War College. He said that President SCHRUEBERS has promised him another position and that he feels his assignment to the NATO War College is an indication that this promise will be kept. He also noted that WEHNER has suggested the possibility of another job on the political level, and HORCHEM does not exclude this possibility becoming a reality. HORCHEM noted that at the time

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he was slated to become WEHNER's personal assistant a number of people in the SPD had objected on the grounds that WEHNER could not name a man to be his personal assistant who is not yet a member of the party and who came from the BfV. HORCHEM admitted that he has now become a party member and that he hopes WEHNER will find a position where the BfV stigma will not play such a major role. HORCHEM noted that his own promotion to Regierungs Direktor makes the waiting a good deal easier, and he finds the assignment to the NATO War College pleasant in the extreme. HORCHEM's entire class of 50 students flew to Canada in a Belgian DC-6 last Saturday. After three days in Canada they came to Washington on 26 March for three days of briefings. The 26th was the only evening which HORCHEM had free since the State Department has arranged a reception on the evening of the 27th, and the Turkish Ambassador is entertaining the entire class on the evening of the 28th. (The present Commandant of the NATO War College is a Turkish General and, therefore, the Turkish Ambassador feels it incumbent upon him to entertain the class during their visit here.) On Friday, 29 March, the class will fly to Norfolk and thereafter on to New Orleans. From New Orleans they proceed to Colorado Springs, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and then return to New York City for a brief visit before returning to Rome. The entire trip will last three weeks. HORCHEM indicated a kind of tentative expectation that he will officially visit Washington in the fall, apparently at the invitation of CIA, although he was not at all specific on this point and I made no attempt to explore the matter. I did not really feel that HORCHEM was "fishing"--he simply mentioned in passing that he might well have the opportunity to visit officially in the fall.

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